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Abstract
Amid a broader reckoning about the role of social
media in public life, this article argues that the same
scrutiny can be applied to the journalism studies field
and its approaches to examining social media. A decade
later, what hath such research wrought? We need a
more particular accounting of the assumptions, biases,
and blind spots that have crept into this line of research
as well as the study of mediated conversations broadly.
Our purpose is to provoke reflection and chart a path
for future research by critiquing themes of what has
come before. In particular, we seek to untangle three
faulty assumptions—often implicit but no less
influential—that have been overlooked in the rapid
take-up of social media as a key phenomenon for
journalism studies particularly and digital media
studies generally: (1) that social media would be a net
positive; (2) that social media reflects reality; and (3)
that social media matters over and above other factors.

1. Introduction
In 2015, when the first author visited a U.S.
metropolitan newspaper in the throes of trying to reinvent
itself for the digital era, a management ultimatum had
recently been delivered to the few reluctant late-adopters
there: Be an active contributor on social media, or else. The
message went something like this: If you’re not on Twitter,
get an account already—and make sure you have at least a
few hundred followers by the end of the year. We’ll be
tracking your activity.1 The intensity of the message
matched the urgency that the newspaper’s managers felt—
an urgency about meeting audiences where they were
(increasingly on social platforms outside the newspaper’s
control) and thereby steering those audiences back to the
newspaper’s own proprietary platforms (its website and
apps). The hope was that social media, once a curiosity
beginning with MySpace in the mid-2000s and now
suddenly the dominant means of public conversation,
might be just the thing to save news organizations—to
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revitalize, and hopefully monetize, audience attention in a
world awash in attractive alternatives to news. To be active
on Twitter and Facebook, as well as Snapchat, Instagram,
and the rest, was seen by many news managers as an
obvious and necessary step in journalism’s digital-first
transformation.
In many cases, journalists actually were ahead of their
bosses as early and eager adopters of social media,
embracing the opportunity to develop a personal brand,
follow and converse with fellow journalists, seek new
sources and ideas, and enjoy a metric-based manifestation
that people indeed liked and shared their work. For many
journalists, being on social media also meant being
exposed to unruly publics and their criticisms, and feeling
obligated to manage yet another platform around the clock.
But the general story of social media and journalism, as
told through public discourse and by now scores of
academic studies published in the past decade, is one of
journalists readily adopting and navigating an intriguing
new space, overall adapting it to meet their needs and
reaffirm their journalistic authority. More to the point, the
collective hope for social media and journalism over the
past decade, as painted especially in the trade press but also
in the academic literature, has been one of implicit
positivity: that, on balance, social media would be a net
benefit for individual journalists, for journalism as an
institution, and for society as a whole.
How things have changed. Social media, once
heralded for its role in democratic uprisings around the
world and seen as a critical point of passage for activism in
the digital age [80], is now being re-evaluated for its social
impact, amid broader questions about data privacy,
hacking, and government surveillance, as well as doxxing,
harassment, and hate speech online [35][82]. Particularly
in the United States but elsewhere as well, the public
narrative about social media changed dramatically after the
2016 election of President Donald J. Trump, which brought
to the fore concerns about widespread malfeasance on
social media—from “fake news,” propaganda, and
coordinated disinformation to bot-based media
manipulation and alt-right trolling and misogyny [50].
Summing up the increasingly sour mood by the end of
2017, The Economist [79] was led to wonder, “Do social
media threaten democracy? Facebook, Google and Twitter
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were supposed to save politics as good information drove
out prejudice and falsehood. Something has gone very
wrong.”
Perhaps the same could be said about the intersection
of social media and journalism, particularly as situated
within the broader study of mediated conversations and
their implications for social life. At one level, there is the
institutional threat of social media, as Google and
Facebook vacuum up digital advertising revenue at an
unprecedented rate, leading some observers to conclude
that “[t]he influence of social media platforms and
technology companies is having a greater effect on
American journalism than even the shift from print to
digital”; this because of the widespread takeover of
traditional publishing roles by platforms that “have
evolved beyond their role as distribution channels, and now
control what audiences see and who gets paid for their
attention, and even what format and type of journalism
flourishes” [7]. But where publishers once embraced
platforms as a new and possibly superior distribution
method, many are now seeing referral traffic decline and
some are even quitting Facebook, saying, “It’s been good
for Facebook, but it hasn’t been good for us” (quoted in
[64]). At another level is the lived experience of journalists
on social media. While journalists have always faced
criticism for their work, and while violence and
intimidation against the press can be far more acute in
repressive regimes [17], there is growing evidence that
online culture generally and social media interactions
specifically are contributing to a growing level of hostility
and harassment for journalists in the West [74], particularly
at a time when leading politicians in supposedly “safe”
countries actively question the legitimacy of journalists
and their work [9].
This moment of reckoning, both about social media
and public life as well as social media and journalism
practice, can be extended to include academic inquiries as
well: A decade later, what hath research wrought? In the
broad study of journalism and its digital transformation,
few topics have captivated researchers in the past 10 years
or so quite like social media—its use by journalists, its
interstitial role between journalists and audiences, its
ambient, ephemeral, and spreadable nature, and so much
more. Now, after hundreds of studies on journalism and
social media, we need a more particular accounting of the
assumptions, biases, and blind spots that have crept into
this line of research. To be sure, the research thus far has
been far-reaching and richly informative, and a
comprehensive review of such literature is beyond the
scope of this paper (for overviews, see, e.g., [39][40]).
Rather, our purpose is to offer a provocation for future
research by critiquing themes of what has come before. In
particular, our goal is to explain and untangle three key
assumptions that have been overlooked in the rapid takeup of social media as a key phenomenon for journalism
studies and the wider study of digitally mediated
conversations: (1) that social media would be a net

positive; (2) that social media reflects reality; and (3) that
social media matters over and above other factors.

2. Background
First, a brief word about how we are defining terms
and contexts. The term “social media” has a history longer
than the one we investigate here [33]. In its broadest sense,
it could be applied to any medium that enhances
interpersonal communication, from CB radios to Google
Hangouts. In the early 2000s, blogs and then specific sites
such as Friendster and MySpace were early social media
ventures that shaped expectations for a participatory Web.
But we classify “social media” the way it is now used
colloquially, which is to refer to social networking sites,
apps, and platforms. These, as defined by [11] allow
individuals to create a public profile, build a network of
connections, and “view and traverse” these connections
and profiles (for elaboration, see [18]). By far the most
popular and powerful of these, and indeed the standard by
which all other social media are measured, is Facebook.
Thus, social media as we know them took hold in 2006, the
year when Facebook and Twitter, two of the most widely
used social media platforms today, both became available
to the general public.
At that time, the relationship of social media to
journalism was not immediately clear; researchers and
industry observers were captivated by the potential of
blogging, and the term “social media” wasn’t common
parlance. When Facebook launched its algorithmically
generated News Feed in 2006, becoming a dominant
distributor of news was never the company’s desired goal
[15]. But just a few years later, in the midst of a global
recession, newsrooms everywhere—but particularly in the
United States, where the prevailing news business models
were heavily reliant on advertising revenue—began
shrinking as advertisers and consumers cut their spending
[29]. The question quickly became what could “save”
journalism, and the immediate and expedient answer was
social media (for some context, consider [5]). These
platforms were experiencing exponential growth (Twitter,
for instance, ballooned from a few million active users in
2008 to more than 100 million in 2011), and newsmakers
rushed to follow audiences there [63]. The thinking was
that this new method of communication would enhance
news distribution and enable stronger connections between
journalists and their audiences [55]. Indeed, such hopes
were the culmination of burgeoning expectations in the
2000s, on the part of industry professionals and academics
alike, that citizen engagement in news-making would
rejuvenate journalism and democracy. Those expectations,
as [68] explains in his article on “dark participation” in this
special issue, have since proven to be wildly mistaken:
“Media managers’ economic fantasies of a willing, free
workforce were equally misguided as the rather naïve
academic notions of a revitalized journalism in direct
debate with its active users; both sacrificed empirical
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realism for fantasies that were driven by their own goals
and hopes resulting in either a greedy or an idealistic
projection.”
Now, a decade after social media was seen in some
quarters as journalism’s savior as well as a vital catalyst for
connection and social change broadly, it is being decried as
a cesspool of misinformation and fake news (e.g., [32]).
This rise and fall of social media is but one example of a
tendency in journalism’s trade discourse to prop up a
succession of technologies as the means of saving
journalism (or at least markedly improving it). Over the
years, multiple innovations have emerged as the thing that
would rescue journalism, only to be replaced by the next
idea: multimedia storytelling, customization and
personalization, online video, mobile devices, mobile apps,
paywalls, and now virtual and augmented reality. Each has
come with overinflated expectations that were eventually
tempered by a more modest appraisal [23]. Social media,
however, has proven particularly persistent among
journalists. Nearly all of them use social media in their
work, and many say it is essential [85].
In parallel, researchers studying journalism and social
media also jumped in with both feet in 2008, and have not
lost interest. According to Google Scholar, the number of
new research works mentioning social media and
journalism to some degree nearly doubled each year from
2008 (993 articles) to 2011 (5,440 articles). The number of
new articles, chapters, and books peaked at 16,600 in 2016
(see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Number of search results for the
query “‘social media’ journalism” in Google
Scholar, accounting for new articles published
in each of the years 2005 through 2017.
This body of research on journalism and social media
has multiple homes, including connections to sociology,
behavioral economics, and psychology, as well as
contemporary pursuits in political communication
especially as well as media and communication studies
broadly. Our assessment focuses on work within

journalism studies, a field defined not merely by its topical
focus on news but particularly by its exploration of the
many contexts and processes through which journalism
emerges [16]. This narrower focus on journalism studies
has two reasons. First, journalism studies has become
recognizable as its own field, distinct from others adjacent
to it, much more recently than those mentioned above (e.g.,
the field’s two oldest journals, Journalism and Journalism
Studies, were both founded in 2000). It is therefore
incumbent on those working in this field to continue
articulating and clarifying its basis for research, including
especially the assumptions that underlie this work. Second,
the field’s unique identity has been profoundly influenced
by the study of journalism and social media, partially
because journalism studies has grown up in the social
media era. Thus, while other fields also study social media
and journalism, the assumptions described here are of
particular relevance to journalism studies and have not
been examined explicitly within that field. This is
particularly true of research that examines how social
media are affecting journalism—e.g., studies of social
media content that journalists produce, how journalists
integrate social media into their work, social media as
publishing platforms, and (to a lesser extent) news
consumption on social media.
These areas of research have by now developed
consistent themes based on the assumptions outlined here.
Studies of social media and journalism frequently rely on
two overarching narratives, one addressing normalization
and one addressing control. Normalization focuses on
changes in how journalists themselves relate to their
profession and its institutional role, while control focuses
on changes in journalists’ relationships with their
audiences and content. In both cases, the focus is on
change, with the advent of digital communication—and
specifically social media—being the fulcrum about which
these changes have occurred. For instance, a greater
adoption of social media is usually juxtaposed with a
diminishing emphasis on “traditional” journalistic
practices or roles.
The narrative of normalization suggests that
journalists using social media have in some cases imposed
existing journalistic norms on the new platforms and in
others adopted elements of social media as newly
journalistic [46]. This has been called a “hybrid
normalization” [8] as new platforms become more deeply
integrated into journalistic routines. The focus, then, is to
learn which things change and which do not as social media
platforms mesh with journalism. Thus far, it appears that
journalists still prefer to separate themselves from their
audiences [57] but are willing to offer more opinion and
personality [3][56]. The new normal on social media is also
characterized by the hybrid mixing of contexts and
practices as boundaries collapse between personal and
professional, public and private [39]. In sum, longstanding
journalistic conventions are being reconfigured on social
media networks [40].
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The narrative of control explores who is in charge of
news selection, construction, and distribution. With respect
to news audiences, researchers have treated social media as
a boon, one resulting in more access, more personalization,
more interactivity, and the possibility to embed news and
conversations about it in social networks [41]. This
increase in the audience’s power comes in part as
journalists’ gatekeeping and agenda-setting influences
wane [72]. When news is created and distributed outside
the institutional logic of journalism [39], tensions arise
between journalists’ desire for professional control and
audiences’ abilities to circumvent it [47]. These tensions
are exemplified by the question of who is a journalist and
what qualifies as journalism in a world where the
boundaries seem less fixed and more fluid [14]. In recent
years, however, the question of control has become
particularly pronounced in the context of publishing and
distribution [2]: Once news is made by journalists, who
controls how it moves and where it appears across various
platforms (legacy and new, proprietary and nonproprietary, etc.) as well as how it is monetized
accordingly? As digital intermediaries, especially Google
and Facebook, control the primary distribution channels as
well as an ever-larger share of digital advertising revenues,
they exert wider control over the public visibility and
economic viability of news. This is much to the confusion
and consternation of news media organizations that
simultaneously fear missing out on the massive audiences
offered by such platforms but also worry about the longterm trade-offs of allowing technology companies to
supersede them as publishers [62][7]. In all, social media
has been understood as a conduit by which audiences and
social media firms themselves have siphoned off some of
journalists’ power and control over news production and
distribution by shifting these processes to platforms that
news organizations don’t own.
Against this backdrop of a decade of research on social
media in journalism studies, we ask: What has not been
accounted for adequately? This essay identifies three
assumptions embedded in this line of research that need
further questioning. At times, journalists, policymakers,
and pundits also make assertions based on these
assumptions, but we are concerned here with identifying
what these assumptions mean for journalism studies
particularly. As researchers seek to track and explain key
developments in this area, what scents, as it were, have
been lost amid the prevailing winds? There may be other
assumptions embedded in the literature that merit scrutiny;
these, however, appear to be the most salient and also the
most likely to inhibit a more realistic and reflexive agenda
for the study of social media and journalism moving
forward. Finally, as authors, we are not immune to critique
in this process. Having published many studies in this area,
including one of the most-cited works on journalists’ use
of Twitter [46], we are well aware that we have contributed
to the some of the problems outlined below and thus, akin
to Witschge and colleagues [87], are “dealing with the
mess (we made)” as self-critically as possible.

3. Assumption 1: Social media would be a
net positive
If the main narratives around social media in
journalism studies focus on change, it is usually assumed
that such change will be for the better. Researchers have
suggested that social media would become a primary
enabler of greater transparency [66][69], reciprocity [49],
and openness in journalism [48]. Social media should allow
journalism to achieve a wider reach [41] and greater
immediacy [89]. Some of this potential has been realized,
but much of it has not. Social media has been a gold mine
of source material [26], with some limited evidence that it
may upend journalists’ traditional reliance on official
sources [42][65]—though the use of social media for
sourcing tends to happen more in extraordinary events
rather than in everyday reporting [6]. And, social media
platforms play an indispensable role in circulating breaking
news, particularly in crisis situations (e.g., [83]). But, on
the other hand, the torrent of information is often so
extreme that rather than attempt to verify content on social
media, some journalists simply wait for other, larger news
outlets to do so [12]. Social media provide the possibility
of a new form of “live” journalism [89], and yet journalists
live-tweeting the 2012 U.S. presidential debates spent less
time fact-checking candidate claims and more time making
jokes [22].
Beyond the problem of unrealized potential is the
concern that major lines of research have all but baked in
implicit optimism regarding social media. Researchers
tend to assume, for example, that virtually all forms of
journalist-audience interaction—by various approaches
labeled engagement [58], participation [11], reciprocity
[49], and more—are positive, in part because such
interactions contribute to diminishing the much-maligned
mask of objectivity, neutrality, and detachedness behind
which journalistic work is black-boxed to public view (for
a fuller discussion of notions such as “transparency is the
new objectivity,” see [84]). There are, of course, pro-social
outcomes that may flow when audience members engage
with journalists, such as the improvement in civility that
emerges after journalists actively engage with the public in
online comment sections [76]. But, based on our fieldwork,
interviews, and
observations, journalist-audience
interactions may be overwhelmingly negative for
journalists (let alone for users), and in ways not fully
captured in the literature thus far.
Perhaps most salient among these problematic
interactions are the many forms of harassment that are
endemic to social media generally and increasingly a
concern for journalists as well. Journalists on social
media—particularly female and minority journalists, and
particularly on Twitter—are frequently targeted by trolls
and other malicious actors [74]. “They’re smart, they’re
relentless, they’ll find you,” one Washington Post
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journalist told us about the trolls.2 While researchers have
begun to study harassment and the forms it takes for
journalists on social media [19], journalism studies has yet
to reconcile what this means for the larger power dynamics
on social media: who gets to speak, with what impact, and
with what degree of accountability. For example, Robinson
[70] suggests that power and privilege play a far greater
part in negotiating roles among journalists, activists, and
publics than previously acknowledged in journalism
studies. And, what if, as increasingly appears to be the case,
being on social media has predominantly meant putting
oneself at the potential mercies of the “Twitter mob”
[86]—a form of moral outrage that, while as old as the
human species itself, has become accelerated in the age of
social media [24]. Moreover, Massanari’s [51] study of the
#Gamergate controversy, while not directly about
journalism, points to two missed opportunities in
journalism studies on social media: the relative neglect of
Reddit as a social platform for study as well as the
misogynistic subcultures that from Reddit spread to far
parts of the social web. In all, in mostly focusing on the
journalistic practices and audience interactions afforded by
social media, journalism scholars have assumed positivity
and thereby misread toxicity, particularly when it comes to
gendered harassment.
The assumption that social media would be a net
positive for journalism is also manifest in the industry logic
that everyone should be there, which is felt keenly by
journalists [45]. This normative “should” extends to
research as well, especially when those studying
technology adoption in newsrooms or other journalistic
routines assume that those who do not use social media will
be left out or left behind. The danger in this, of course, is
that social media amplify journalism’s pack mentality [25]
in both scope and force, a fact sometimes overlooked in
journalism studies. Journalists are regularly accused of
piling on (focusing too much on one thing) or being
thoroughly distracted (focusing on the wrong thing). The
case is particularly acute when the president of the United
States, already a subject of intense journalistic attention,
has a habit of making provocative and controversial
statements on Twitter. The upshot is that journalists now
consider social media spats to be urgent, breaking news—
prompting them, for example, to send push notifications to
smartphone users informing them that Donald Trump and
his former FBI director are calling each other names. This
pack mentality on social media remains understudied by
journalism scholars, as does a related problem: the
journalist’s relationship to the so-called “filter bubble.”
Seeing only part of the world because you are ensconced in
an echo chamber was initially a point of concern regarding
citizens in going online [78]. But following a flurry of
studies on the phenomenon of fake news after the 2016
U.S. presidential election (among them, [1]), it appears
likely that echo chambers are more evident among
journalists themselves, rather than ordinary users of social
2

media. Audiences are actually exposed to a wider range of
opinions and sources than might be expected [31], while
journalists talk mainly to each other [57]. Moreover,
network science research has found “a modest correlation
between the ideologies of who a journalist follows on
Twitter and the content he or she produces” [88]—a
connection that has yet to be explored in journalism
studies.
The industry logic that everyone must be on social
media plays out at organizational and institutional levels as
well. Our own fieldwork and interviews have shown that
journalists are strongly encouraged or even forced to use
social media, as supervisors begin to count how often
journalists post and how widely these posts spread.
Surprisingly, given the time involved in developing a social
media brand, the return on this time investment is rarely
questioned, either in the trade press or in the research
literature. A notable exception is Chyi’s work examining
the value of online news, mobile news, and social media
relative to other forms of news consumption and
engagement (e.g., [43][20]); the findings often suggest that
returns are well below the industry’s hopes. Is it possible
that audiences don’t want or aren’t impressed by
journalists’ online engagement (cf. [58])? Or, even in the
best case, where journalists use social media to the full
potential that scholars attribute to it, is it possible that the
benefits to journalism are small relative to other
investments of effort? Or simply that the power of social
media platforms and their control over data collection and
revenue generation make it unlikely, if not impossible, to
build a business model under such conditions [7]? Overall,
journalism studies has not sufficiently accounted for the
time displacement of journalistic labor caused by a focus
on social media. For example, it’s worth considering: what
are journalists not doing because they are managing social
media? Such a question may be purely hypothetical, but it
bears asking when assumptions of positive results from
social media can lead researchers away from evaluating the
tradeoffs of time, talent, and attention.

4. Assumption 2: Social media reflects reality
It is now common for journalists to point to social
media posts, particularly tweets, as an indicator of what
people are saying [4][13][30]. The logic is that Twitter is a
modern version of person-on-the-street interviews, or even
a journalistic stand-in for actual polling. While this was
never a reliable way of gauging public opinion, the fact that
Twitter makes these vox populi searchable and embeddable
vastly reduces the effort that it takes to collect and call upon
them. Its use has proliferated to the point that journalists
see Twitter as a reliable source of news [53]. Indeed, as the
Columbia Journalism Review acknowledged, in reporting
on many news organizations erroneously embedding
tweets from the infamous Internet Research Agency in
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Russia, “American media outlets have a Twitter problem.
The problem is not journalists’ notorious addiction to the
platform—it’s their use of tweets as a way to include
opinions from ‘ordinary people.’ Often, these ordinary
people turn out not to be ‘ordinary’ or ‘people’ at all” [81].
In a similar vein, researchers have too often assumed
that social media networks are a reasonable approximation
of public opinion or other aspects of the (offline) social
world. Most commonly, perhaps, this manifests itself in the
use of social media to represent public sentiment in agendasetting studies (e.g., [73][59], even while many such
studies readily acknowledge that they may not be accurate
representations of the public. More broadly, several studies
have attempted to use social media chatter as a predictor of
election results (for a review, see [34]), and, in general,
scholars have turned to social media posts and related trace
data as evidence of what people are thinking or feeling. The
problem, as [37] shows, is that bigger data is not
necessarily better data: because people do not choose to use
particular social media platforms at random, samples
drawn from such spaces are inherently limited in their
generalizability.
As such, Twitter, the most popular platform for U.S.
journalists and the most popular for studies of journalism
on social media, is demonstrably not representative of the
public [54][44]. It’s more appropriate to think of Twitter as
a public, rather than the public. While that concern is by
now well understood, the broader composition and
representation of social media publics is more complicated
still, and has eluded many researchers examining social
media and journalism. For example, some studies suggest
that power dynamics and hegemony at work on social
media shape which voices are present and which are heard
(e.g., [62]). Media and other elites, in particular, have
greater power and reach than the average social media
user—even in cases, such as Andy Carvin’s use of Twitter
during the 2011 Arab Spring, when journalists presumably
might be sourcing more non-elite opinion than usual [42].
In fact, it is common for social media metrics to quantify
one’s “influence,” and in some cases this authority is
institutionalized and made visible through a “verified”
status (as in the blue checkmark on Twitter). In all, a more
direct reckoning with the sharp differences that can exist
among users has often been overlooked in this line of
research. While some have attempted to separate groups in
analysis of Twitter content [52], it is far more common to
see social media publics treated as homogeneous wholes.
To develop such broad characterizations obscures the
power differentials that shape both who speaks and, more
importantly, who is heard on social media (for further
discussion, see [70]). It also may disregard subcultures and
minority groupings such as Black Twitter [71]; these subnetworks are embedded within larger social media publics
but may have unique characteristics and behaviors of their
own [21]. This is to say nothing of those groups that are not
online and thus simply are left out of any analysis of social
media content.

The larger question is whether social media content,
in any of its forms, is in fact an accurate representation of
reality as it is lived and experienced by those creating the
content. As journalists draw on evermore user content to
gauge public sentiment and to tell stories about events at
home and abroad, they are being trained to follow elaborate
procedures for checking and verifying social media content
as factual in a news context [6]. But it may be worth
researchers’ effort to consider whether social media
content, even most of the time, is posted in good faith [38].
Efforts to manipulate public opinion in recent elections are
an obvious example of this concern [1], but it appears at
least possible that many social media users are motivated
not by a desire to accurately express themselves or their
observations but to perform an identity as a way of
belonging [15]. These performances, as all front-stage
social performances [36], are curated and crafted to achieve
a particular end. This is particularly evident among social
media “influencers” who go to great lengths to make their
vlogs, Instagram photos, and selfies appear as natural and
therefore “authentic” as possible, thereby influencing both
the narrative that journalists convey about how “ordinary”
people might get lucky and strike it rich as a YouTuber,
while also masking the actual labor, precarity, and alwayson performativity behind the scenes [28]. It might also be
that people simply act differently when online than they do
in other social settings, emboldened by an “online
disinhibition effect” [77]. Altogether, what people think
and feel, and what they post on social media, may be two
different things. Researchers should not only acknowledge
these limitations but avoid research designs that treat social
media content as a reflection of reality.

5. Assumption 3: Social media matters over
and above other factors
The assumptions outlined so far suggest that, in the
broad literature on journalism and social media during the
past decade, there has been a two-part implicit expectation
in many studies. First, that social media would be a net
positive for journalism as an institution, for journalists as
individuals, and for closer interactions with community
members. And, second, that social media activities reflect
something meaningful about the social world—that while
Twitter publics and the like are by no means pure proxies
for the populace, they are reasonable approximations that
are therefore worth taking seriously. As we have noted
already, both of those assumptions could be true in certain
cases or under certain circumstances, and they are implicit
in our own work. However, if we step back to question the
surety of such assumptions, we are led to wonder: Has the
journalism studies field paid too much attention to social
media? And if so, what forces and factors in journalism’s
digital transformation have been neglected as a result?
Thus, the third and final assumption to untangle here
is the assumption that, for the study of journalism, the
phenomenon of social media matters in a singular way,
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over and above other factors. On one level, as with other
forms of technologically oriented work in contemporary
journalism, of course social media platforms, practices, and
personnel matter. The decade-long dedication of resources,
to a greater and greater degree, by journalists, their
employers, and people at large virtually requires that
journalism scholars pay attention to such developments.
And indeed they have, as Figure 1 attests and as reviews
such as Hermida’s [39][40] chronicle in great detail. On
another level, however, that journalism studies as a field
has been consumed with studying how journalists tweet,
like, and share implies a certain determinism in this
arrangement: that social media has made an impact on
journalistic perceptions and practices that matters over and
above other types of influence that might otherwise have
been chronicled if scholars had turned their gaze in another
direction. Or, perhaps with greater consequence, we as
researchers have attributed to social media credit and
blame that rightly belongs elsewhere, amid the many seachanges washing over journalism in recent years.
Consider first the extent to which journalism studies
has been preoccupied with social media and its associated
dimensions. As Steensen and Ahva ([75], p. 1) note in their
meta-analysis of the field, the latest movement in research
on digital journalism has been focused on the “news
ecosystem,” the “news landscape,” and “ambient” and
“networked” forms of journalism—“all of which,” they
argue, “have emerged because of practices predominantly
related to social media.” The result, Steensen and Ahva
[75] suggest, has been a widespread examination of the
theories by which scholars make sense of journalism.
While no doubt positive for the conceptual development of
journalism as an area of study, this emphasis on practices
afforded by fluid social media spaces perhaps has led
researchers to overlook some pressing issues that span
academic, industry, and policy concerns. For example,
taking the 2017 Future of Journalism conference as an
informal proxy for what journalism studies is actually
studying today (and what it’s not), [60] shows how studies
of business models, innovation, and entrepreneurship are
conspicuously absent. Moreover, while there is great
emphasis on media practices amid social media, including
emerging patterns of disinformation, he finds far less focus
on the power of platform companies and their structural
transformation of the information environment as a whole
(see [7][61]. Thus, time spent analyzing tweets could be
coming at the expense of analyzing the logics of
algorithms, the political economy of technology giants, and
other organizational and institutional arrangements that are
reshaping the contexts for news subsidy (some recent
examples include [35][82]. The powers we observe in
social media platforms may in fact be wielded by their
makers, markets, or even cultural shifts that are masked by
a preoccupation with social media.
Furthermore, the field’s focus on social media, its
micro-practices and journalist-audience interactions,
assumes that such things matter because they reflect
earnest engagement between journalism and its publics in

a deeply normative sense. As [38] deftly show, however,
researchers may have been deceived in assuming an
“earnest Internet.” By this, they mean that “communication
scholarship generally posits that people act rationally and
in good faith; care about facts, truth, and authenticity;
pursue ends in line with their political and social values and
aspirations; and, more philosophically, are fundamentally
good” (p. 1057). But then the 2016 U.S. election happened.
Not only did it reveal a social media ecosystem coursing
with racism, misogyny, and other ugliness, but it also
revealed, they argue, that such expressions were often
voiced “for the lulz”—not out of sincere political interest,
but rather a more ambiguous aim of provoking for its own
sake. Building on Phillips and Milner’s [67] book The
Ambivalent Internet, [38] argue that, in contemporary
digital culture, “we cannot be certain of anyone’s intent or
motivations, meaning is indeterminate, accountability is
nearly impossible, and the social and antisocial are
intertwined” (p. 1058). Thus, it is ambivalence, not
earnestness, that may be the orienting ethos of platforms
increasingly marked by mischief, oddities, and
antagonism. The upshot, they suggest, is a corrosive
undermining of social trust, not merely on social media.
“This goes far beyond the loss of trust in journalism or even
institutions; it cuts to the heart of everyday social relations
and public discourse” (p. 1058). If true, this re-evaluation
calls into question the scores of studies on journalism and
social media that carry an underlying assumption that
social media matters—and matters quite a lot—because it
represents an earnest extension of the public sphere.

6. Conclusion
To be clear, we are not suggesting that a decade of
journalism studies research on social media has been for
naught. Social media, by virtue of its vast diffusion, clearly
matters for social life at large and for news in particular. In
this essay, however, we are questioning the assumptions
and associated blind spots that have developed in this
research, and thus we argue that scholars—ourselves
included—can be more critically reflexive in making sense
of social media’s impact for journalism as an institution,
for journalists as individual media workers; for users,
audiences, and communities engaged in news; and for the
character of public discourse. In journalism studies
especially but in the wider study of mediated conversations
and communication research as well, scholars have too
easily assumed that social media would be a net positive,
reflects reality, and ultimately matters over and above other
factors. These issues are exacerbated when journalism
studies fails to connect itself to and build upon the work of
adjacent fields also grappling with similar questions,
including especially political communication research.
These assumptions, even while implicit, may be
clouding our collective judgment and obscuring issues that
otherwise call out for our attention. Indeed, in emphasizing
the assumedly pro-social audience engagement or in
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fixating on the micro-practices of journalists’ use of
platforms, scholars too often have overlooked the gendered
toxicity, the intra-journalistic insularity, and the
overwhelming power of platform companies, among other
concerns. Thus, in prioritizing social media activities
above other factors, scholars arguably have given less
attention to a number of critical issues that may be more
consequential for the future of journalism—from matters
of organizational innovation and business models to
broader questions about how institutions and ideologies are
constructing the internet architecture on which public
conversations take place.
Ultimately, the explosive growth in research on social
media and journalism can be linked with the similarly
remarkable growth of journalism studies, a field of inquiry
that is less than 20 years old as an institutionalized entity
and is only now beginning to exhibit particular scholarly
commitments [16]. Both are young and maturing areas of
research, and are evolving in tandem with social, political,
economic, and (especially) technological dynamics that
can vary widely around the world. And, just as journalism
studies has been dominated by perspectives from the
Global North, the study of social media and journalism
likewise has been limited not only by the underlying
assumptions we have articulated here, but also by case
studies that too often fail to include adequate diversity on
matters of geography, culture, and language as well as race,
class, and gender. As scholars extend their view to new
contexts and conditions, they may well find additional
ways of challenging the taken-for-granted assumptions of
social media research.
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